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Abstract 
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technology is considered key to mitigating climate change by 
international institutions and governments around the world. The technology is considered 
advantageous because it may enable the continued utilisation of fossil fuels while curbing carbon 
emissions. However, development of the technology remains slow on the ground. It is generally 
argued that large-scale, integrated demonstration projects are needed as a next step towards 
commercialisation. Despite government support in several countries, few projects exist so far 
worldwide. This paper asks the question why it is so difficult to get demonstration projects off the 
ground. The argument is that it is not only project-specific factors that determine the feasibility of 
demonstration projects, but given the need for government support, a variety of political economy 
factors influence decision-making processes by policy makers and companies. The paper introduces 
an analytical framework developed on the basis of the political economy literature that considers six 
sets of factors that influence outcomes. It discusses two specific projects, Longannet in the UK and 
Quest in Canada, and explains why one failed and the other one is under construction. The analysis 
shows that although climate change is a more important policy concern in the UK compared to 
Canada, the specific political economy situation of fossil fuel rich provinces like Alberta has led to the 
Quest project going forward. 
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Many analysts, governments and international organizations see addressing climate change as a major 
challenge for science and technology policy making (Gallagher, Holdren et al. 2006; Mikler and Harrison 
2011). While a number of countries have invested significant resources into developing renewable 
energy technologies, there is a recognition that fossil fuels will play a major role in global energy systems 
for years to come (IEA 2010a). Carbon capture and storage (CCS) has therefore been hailed as a key 
technology for climate change mitigation by the International Energy Agency (IEA), the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and some governments including those of the US, 
Canada, Norway, Australia and the UK (IPCC 2005; HM Government 2010; van Alphen, Hekkert et al. 
2010; IEA 2010b). The aim of CCS is to prevent the release to the atmosphere of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
arising from large point sources by capturing and transporting it to an appropriate site for underground 
sequestration. It is argued that in this way CO2 emissions for example from a coal-fired power plant 
could be reduced by 80-90% (Balat, Balat et al. 2009). A key argument of proponents of CCS is that 
having CCS as part of the climate mitigation portfolio may significantly reduce the overall costs of 
meeting the mitigation target compared to portfolios not using CCS (see e.g. IPPC 2014: 41). 
 
While there has been enthusiasm since at least 2005 when the IPCC published its special report on CCS 
(IPCC 2005) and while many model runs suggest that CCS could be part of the mitigation technology 
portfolio (Riahi, Grübler et al. 2007; Bistline and Rai 2010; Eom, Edmonds et al. in press; Iyer, Hultman et 
al. in press), progress on the ground in terms of large scale, integrated (from capture to storage) 
demonstration projects has been slow. An IEA report tracking CCS progress states that “the largest 
challenge for CCS deployment is the integration of component technologies into large-scale 
demonstration projects” (IEA 2013: 5). Similarly, in 2013 the Global CCS Institute identified eight large 
scale integrated CCS projects around the world, but acknowledged that a number of other projects had 
been cancelled due to “ongoing difficulties in assembling viable business cases” (Global CCS Institute 
2013: 3). By now (2015), the Global CCS Institute counts 14 large-scale CCS projects in operation, most 
of which work on natural gas processing. The first large-scale, integrated CCS project on a commercial 
coal-fired power plant has opened at Boundary Dam in the Canadian province of Saskatchewan in 
October 2014, but several US projects have been delayed. Moreover, by mid 2015 the final investment 
decision had not been taken to build a single large-scale, integrated demonstration project within the 
European Union (although there are several prominent projects such as the Rotterdam Opslag en 
Afvang Demonstratie project (Road), which has yet to receive a final investment decision by its 
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proponents), although funds to support such activities had been set aside since 2012. In July 2014 the 
EU commission awarded €300m of funding to a proposed White Rose project in the UK where front-end 
engineering and design work is currently taking place, but no final investment decision has yet been 
taken. 
 
What is a CCS ‘demonstration’ project and what function does demonstration serve? Technological 
demonstration can be understood as a process of social learning, involving not only the working out of 
scientific or technological uncertainties in the operation of the technology but also the generation of 
accepted facts about the technology, the promotion or ‘selling’ of the technology by interested parties 
to secure public or government support (Shapin 1984; Rosental 2005). CCS demonstration projects are 
intended not only to show that CCS physically works, but also that it can work in the context of existing 
social, political and economic problems, relations and interests. So while CCS is seen as an important 
option for reducing carbon emissions by some, progress on actually 'demonstrating' this has been slow 
(de Coninck, Stephens et al. 2009). This article examines why it has been so difficult to get large-scale, 
integrated CCS demonstration projects off the ground. It develops a political economy perspective on 
the complex array of factors that have influenced the enthusiasm to develop demonstration projects, 
and which have pushed some projects to proceed and others to stall. A political economy perspective 
combines the analysis of political and economic factors which  - in the case of CCS - closely interact, as 
without policy support there is no business case to invest in CCS. This framework will be explained in 
more detail in section 2. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section, we review the relevant CCS literature, outline a 
political economy perspective on the challenges of technological demonstration and argue why such an 
approach is helpful in understanding the difficulties of CCS. The remainder of this article presents two 
case studies, the Scottish Power Longannet project in the UK (section 3) and the Shell Quest project in 
Alberta, Canada (section 4). Section 5 presents the analysis. Section 6 discusses the conclusions that can 
be drawn from the analysis. 
 
2. A political economy perspective on challenges of CCS demonstration 
Approaches to understanding technological development and deployment tend to gravitate around two 
poles. At the micro-level, a focus on project-level organisational and technological characteristics 
predominates, and the question of whether or not to proceed with a proposed technological solution to 
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a given problem often comes down to the costs and risks of that approach in comparison to alternatives 
(e.g. see Bergerson and Lave 2007; Abadie and Chamorro 2008; Szolgayova, Fuss et al. 2008). At the 
macro-level, on the other hand, broader structural trends predominate and the analysis focuses on large 
scale, socio-technological systems associated with key areas of social life such as transportation, 
electricity or agro-food production and how they change (Geels 2004; Nykvist and Whitmarsh 2008; 
Foxon, Hammond et al. 2010; Verbong and Loorbach 2012). A political economy perspective tries to 
situate itself somewhere between these two poles, examining the interplay of a range of economic, 
political and institutional factors in technology-related decision-making processes involving government 
and private sector actors.  
 
The entry of CCS onto the global climate change agenda has led to an emerging social science literature 
on CCS. The majority of this work clusters around two areas: (a) the economics of CCS and the role CCS 
should play within different mitigation scenarios (Rubin, Chen et al. 2007; Otto and Reilly 2008; van der 
Zwaan and Gerlagh 2009); and (b) the public acceptability of CCS (van Alphen, Voorst et al. 2007; de 
Coninck, Flach et al. 2009; Shackley, Reiner et al. 2009). While there has been recognition of the 
importance of political factors contributing to the uncertainties surrounding CCS (Markusson, Kern et al. 
2012; Watson, Kern et al. 2014), consideration of this dimension has largely focused on their impact on 
the economics of the technology - highlighting, for instance, the importance of adequate policy and 
regulatory frameworks to address the ‘financial gap’ and to resolve questions about long-term liability.  
 
The existing literature on CCS is therefore largely 'instrumental' in character, examining the various 
policy approaches that might stimulate CCS development and trying to find the most effective solution 
(Groenenberg and de Coninck 2008; Scrase and Watson 2009; von Stechow, Watson et al. 2011;  
Backstrand, Meadowcroft and Oppenheimer 2011). At this level of analysis the answer to our research 
question (understanding the difficulty of getting demonstration projects off the ground) is to point to 
the absence of policy and regulatory frameworks adequate to assuage industry uncertainty and resolve 
the ‘financial gap’. Add to this a policy paradigm (at least in most OECD countries) that emphasizes 
markets and 'technological-neutrality' of policy interventions in the energy sector (Kern, Kuzemko et al. 
2014), and one arrives at the received wisdom concerning the barriers to successful demonstration: CCS 
cannot currently be justified as an emissions-reducing technology at the project level in the absence of 
substantial public incentives, which could be supplied through economy-wide carbon pricing (with a 




Yet there remain unaddressed issues that are clearly relevant to why such demonstration projects are 
hard to get off the ground. While the financial gap and lack of carbon pricing are indeed important 
barriers, the factors that play into governments’ decisions to do (or not to do) something about these 
barriers are rarely if ever considered. Nor does this speak to the role that varying access to government 
by energy sector interests might play in shaping policy outputs. In short, what is missing in the existing 
literature on CCS is a more critical analysis of the complex interplay of factors that shape policy at the 
intermediate state/market level. It is here that a political economy framework for understanding 
technological development can be most fruitful. The focus at this intermediate level - between site-
specific projects and larger macro-trends - is not on what policies are most effective or efficient in 
deploying CCS, or on defining the place of CCS in a ‘truly sustainable’ energy system. Instead, it is on the 
factors that influence social, technological and policy choice and design over a medium-term timeframe 
(5 to 10 years).  
 
Political economy is defined by its interest in the relationship between the state and the market 
(Gamble, Payne et al. 1996) and how the interaction between the two contributes to outcomes in either 
sphere. The relationship of primary concern in assessing CCS demonstration project development is that 
between public policy makers and private enterprises. In this context, it is worth emphasising that the 
realization of a large-scale CCS demonstration project requires a substantial commitment from both 
government and the industrial actors that will build and operate the facilities. Precisely because it 
involves demonstration of technological systems that are not fully commercialized, we are a long way 
from 'business as usual' for either party. CCS projects are expensive, involving large upfront investment, 
and continuing costs for CO2 capture, transport and disposal over the life of the plant. They present 
substantial risks to all participants including, for example, construction over-runs, technological 
problems (integrating CCS reliably with the normal plant operations, or unforeseen difficulties at the 
storage site), and reputational risks to firms, regulators and politicians should things go wrong 
(Markusson, Kern et al. 2012). These projects are complex, not just from an engineering perspective, but 
also in terms of financing and regulatory arrangements, and interactions with multiple partners and 
publics. Although governments could in principle build such projects themselves, in practice in OECD 
countries their role is primarily focused on funding and regulation, with construction and operation left 
to industrial actors (although in some cases these may ultimately be state-owned firms). The decision to 
go ahead and build such a project involves complex negotiations, and the approval of both government 
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and the companies concerned. The lumpy character of the investment, and the risks and complexities of 
these projects, suggest that they are likely to be difficult to get off the ground.  
 
Moreover, the political economy inspired literature has pointed to an important contrast between CCS 
and other low carbon technological options (such a wind or solar). Since CCS is essentially a pollution 
control technology that is to be married with existing fossil energy systems, many of its 'natural' 
proponents (producers of fossil fuels, operators of large scale combustion facilities) face split incentives 
(Meadowcroft and Langhelle 2009). In a climate constrained world these parties would gain from the 
availability of low cost CCS, because they could continue to exploit their fossil energy reserves. Yet in the 
short term CCS represents a headache: it is very expensive, untried at scale, and imposes additional 
business risks. So firms may be encouraged: (a) to delay investment in proving CCS at scale (since to the 
extent that it is proven -- say for coal-fired power generation -- the demand from the public and 
regulators to deploy it will immediately rise), and/or (b) to resist policy measures (such as carbon pricing 
or emissions regulations) that would drive CCS innovation, but which represent a major cost penalty 
today. In contrast, proponents of non-fossil energy systems (e.g. based on renewable energy 
technologies) have a direct incentive not only to accelerate the development of these technologies (to 
improve their characteristics and reduce price), but also to lend political support to stronger climate 
policy which would only make their products more cost-competitive. The effect described here seems to 
be most pronounced with coal producers and coal-fired electricity generators where 'clean coal' often 
appears as a future ideal as long as it does not need to be paid for today. The situation with the oil and 
gas industry is more nuanced. There is greater familiarity with the technologies involved in CCS (for 
example, CO2 separation is often necessary for gas production and CO2 injection has long been used for 
enhanced oil recovery, EOR). Moreover some firms see business opportunities related to capture, 
transport or storage.    
 
The character of CCS as an 'end of pipe' technology also has potential political salience. It is relatively 
easy for opponents to characterise CCS as a 'bury and forget' technology that fails to represent a 
decisive break with fossil energy systems that are causing so much climate (and other environmental) 
damage (Stephens 2014). So the strongest proponents of vigorous climate policy may have ambivalent 
(or even hostile) attitude to CCS. What some present at CCS's greatest virtue (its continuity with 




Accordingly, this paper builds on the existing literature on the political economy of CCS (Meadowcroft 
and Langhelle 2009; Torvanger and Meadowcroft 2011) and the political economy literature more 
generally (Hayward 1998; Chang 2002; Hay 2004; Mikler and Harrison 2011; Meadowcroft 2005) to 
develop a framework for analysing the political economy of CCS demonstration projects. This framework 
differs from macro perspectives on innovation and technology development by structuring the search 
for specific political and economic factors that influence  comingled public/private decisions on 
technology demonstration. Thus, for example, it offers an alternative (and in this context a more 
focused and politically sensitive) framework to the 'multi-level perspective' with its accent on niche-
regime interactions in the context of an evolving 'landscape' (Geels 2002). The analytical framework is 
presented in a simplified form in Figure 1. 
 




































































































































The figure presents six broad sets of factors which political economy literatures suggest might influence 
decisions about the implementation of specific CCS demonstration projects. It is important to point out 
that these factors are not considered as static; rather they interact dynamically during the negotiation 
processes described in section 3 and 4. The following text briefly explains the factors and from which 
sources they were derived. A summary is provided in Table 1.  
 
As existing literature on CCS demonstration projects illustrates, outcomes are clearly influenced by the 
nature of the project, including its technical features, the strategic goals and resources of the 
organizations that would finance, build and operate the facility, the potential for EOR revenues, and so 
on (factor 1) (IEA 2013, Global CCS Institute 2013). Existing government priorities and policy regimes are 
a second element, especially the orientation and stringency of climate policy and the nature of more 
specific CCS support measures, but also more general energy policy concerns (including costs and 
security of supply) (factor 2). The importance of government priorities and policy regimes for 
development, demonstration and deployment of climate mitigation technologies has been emphasized 
by the political economy literature on 'green industrial policy' (Muzzucato 2014; Rodrik 2004, 2014; 
Schwarzer 2013). istorically contingent political-institutional structures (factor 3) provide an important 
context within which policy and economic decision making processes take place (Chang 2002; Eberlein 
and Doern 2009; Kern 2011). This includes policy legacies as well as the specific institutional set up 
(Kuzemko 2013). More broadly it includes legal/constitutional arrangements such as federal division of 
powers the executive, legislature, court linkages and the electoral system. Economic factors represent 
another significant dimension, including issues relating to resource endowments and the scale of fossil 
fuel extraction industries, economic development trajectories, key economic interests and actors 
(Eberlein and Doern 2009; Torvanger and Meadowcroft 2011) (factor 4). The presence of public and 
political opposition to, or support for, CCS - either generally or in the specific community where a 
project is proposed can also play a major role (Brunsting, Best-Waldhober et al. 2011) (factor 5). Finally, 
international dimensions, relating for example to respect for international agreements, or the potential 
creation or loss of markets, can play a role (factor 6), for the general significance of such 
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international/national linkages is now well established in the political economy literature (Frieden and 
Martin 2003; Oatley 2015).    
 
Each of these factors can influence perception of the 'financial gap' that confronts project proponents, 
but can also influence the perspectives of governments and proponents directly. It is important to note 
that these factors are not entirely independent, for at a deeper level economic factors may influence the 
character of the policy regime, political-institutional factors may influence the behaviour of economic 
actors, and so on. But these classes of factors are nevertheless helpful in understanding the 
circumstances that are more or less favourable to getting demonstration projects off the ground. We 
argue that the factors in Figure 1 all point to potentially important elements influencing decision-
making, but that the relative significance of these factors will vary in each case of CCS demonstration 
and cannot be determined a priori, and therefore must be established by empirical investigation of 
specific projects. The two case studies are used to assess this framework and to discover how different 
elements interact with one another in decision-making processes. 
 
Table 1: Summary of political economy factors 
Factor Definition of factor Examples of potential impacts on CCS 




Core features of the proposed demonstration facility, including 
technical characteristics (CO2 source, capture technology, 
transport options, storage formation, location, scale); project 
partners (participating firms, public sector partners, proprietary 
technologies); project financing (private funding, public 
funding); Enhanced oil recovery options.  
More technically demanding projects, with multiple 
private partners, and without an added revenue stream 






The specific government objectives, frameworks and measures 
that regulate the energy/climate policy field within which CCS is 
articulated as a policy solution. This includes the general 
orientation of energy policy (preoccupations with energy 
security, costs, revenues, regional development, etc); the 
overall character of climate policy (stringency, targets, favored 
policy instruments, carbon pricing mechanism and level, etc); 
and the CCS-specific policy initiatives (regulatory frameworks, 
financing mechanisms, R&D support, liability regime, etc). 
Strong climate policy objectives, carbon pricing 
mechanism with a substantial incentive for emissions 
abatement, and regulatory clarity and simplicity, favor 




Economic circumstances, beyond the project specific financing 
considered in factor 1 above. These include the general macro 
economic climate, established resource endowments, fossil fuel 
reserves, scale of fossil extraction in the economy, public 
finance and export earnings. 
Difficult economic circumstances (recession, low 
resource prices) make CCS demonstration projects less 
likely to go ahead. Substantial remaining fossil fuel 
reserves, and fossil energy extraction assuming a 
prominent place in economic activity, government 







Established characteristics of the political and policy system 
which structure interactions of political and societal actors 
dealing with energy and climate related issues, including: policy 
legacies and paradigms, political culture, and constitutional 
allocations of power across branches of government and 
geographic space (federalism). These political institutional 
structures influence the way political power is articulated and 
exercised, establishing avenues for influence and points of veto.  
Established regulatory structures and political norms 
may favour or discourage state support for large scale 
demonstration plants. Political system variables may cut 
either way, facilitating the action of proponents or veto 
players in different contexts. 






Technology specific perspectives on CCS articulated by 
politicians, civil society organizations, the media and the public. 
These can be supportive, critical or broadly neutral. They are 
manifest at two distinct but interrelated levels: (a) in general 
political/policy argument (Is CCS a good idea? Should 
governments be funding it? Is it safe? Does it perpetuate fossil 
fuel dependence?); and (b) in local communities where CCS 
demonstration project are to be cited. 
Strong political and/or public opposition either 
generally or at the local level makes CCS demonstration 
project less likely to go ahead. 
6. International 
dimensions 
International linkages which impact decision-making by public 
and private parties, including international agreements (around 
climate change), threats and opportunities for markets (for 
fossil energy, CCS related technologies). 
Stronger adhesion to international climate agreements 
should make public and private actors more enthusiastic 
about CCS demonstration. Threats to market access 
should increase appetite for demonstration projects. 
 
 
The analysis in the following sections looks at the interaction between states and markets in two cases 
of large-scale integrated CCS demonstration projects: a project which failed to secure final investment 
decision in the UK (Longannet) and a successful project in the Canadian province of Alberta (Shell 
Quest). Using a process tracing methodology (George and Bennett 2005), we focus on the political and 
economic dynamics that have contributed to the contrasting results and which illustrate the difficulties 
confronting CCS demonstration projects. The analysis draws on both secondary sources (including IEA 
reports, academic literature, etc) and primary energy and economic data from variety of sources, project 
documentation, policy documents etc.  
 
3. CCS in the UK and ScottishPower’s Longannet demonstration project 
Energy and climate change policy in the UK have become closely aligned over the last decade. At least 
since the Energy White Paper in 2003, long term decarbonisation targets to combat climate change have 
played an important part in UK energy policy (DTI 2003; Scrase and MacKerron 2009) (factor 2). A 
dedicated Department for Energy and Climate Change was established in 2008, bringing together 
responsibilities for energy policy and climate change (factor 3). A legally binding 80% carbon reduction 
target by 2050 was enshrined in the 2009 Climate Change Act. The electricity sector is supposed to play 
a particularly important role in meeting climate change targets and the government is aiming to 
significantly decarbonise the sector by 2030. CCS, alongside nuclear power and offshore wind, has been 
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foregrounded as a central plank of UK energy and climate change policy (HM Government 2009) (factor 
2). This position reflects the UK Government’s view that CCS has the potential to make a major 
contribution to meeting the UK’s CO2 reduction targets: 
‘By 2020 well over half of the UK’s electricity generation will still be fuelled by coal and gas. That is 
why CCS is such a crucial element of this Government’s energy and climate change agenda. It is the 
only technology that can significantly reduce CO2 emissions from fossil fuel power stations - by as 
much as 90%. IEA analysis has shown that without CCS, halving global emissions by 2050 will be 70 
per cent more expensive’ (DECC, 2011c). 
 
Energy security is also a key concern of policy makers (DTI 2007). CCS is seen as one of the technological 
options to help deliver on both these policy goals as it allows the continued use of fossil fuels to increase 
or maintain energy security, but in a way which is consistent with stringent carbon reduction targets 
(Scrase and Watson 2009) (factor 2). Internationally, the UK wants to be seen as a leader in climate 
change mitigation policy and to accelerate commercialisation of the technology so it will be available 
globally, for example in countries such as China and India (factor 6). The UK had a Kyoto target of 
reducing emissions by 12.5% compared to 1990 by 2008-2012 and managed to achieve an emission 
reduction of 22.5% (factor 2). The UK government is actively encouraging countries to pledge emission 
reduction targets for 2020 under the UN framework, and supports proposals for a 30% reduction target 
for EU emissions by 2020 compared to 1990 levels (factor 6).  
 
However, given the early stage of development of CCS, a number of large-scale demonstration projects 
(the UK government hopes to support four) and the subsequent commercialisation of the technology 
(assisted through policy support such as ‘contracts for difference’1) are seen as key next steps (factor 2). 
The Department of Energy and Climate Change’s aspiration was that the demonstration projects would 
help ensure CCS was ready for commercial deployment by 2020, and in particular, that the further three 
projects would assist in the ‘transition to commercial viability’ after the ‘initial demonstration at 
commercial scale’ (DECC, 2010c: 17). 
 
In 2007, the UK government therefore launched a competition to build the UK’s first large integrated 
demonstration plant. The aim was to ‘make the UK a world leader in this globally important technology’ 
(DECC, 2009; DTI, 2007: 15). Capital support of £1bn was offered. The competition was restricted to 
post-combustion capture on a coal-fired power station (factor 2). Nevertheless, nine competing projects 
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were proposed by the private sector. After assessing the technical competence of the bidders at a pre-
qualification stage, the number of competing projects was reduced to four. By November 2009 just two 
bidders remained, as both BP and the Peel Consortium withdrew from the competition (NAO, 2012). But 
on the same day this development was made public, E.ON also withdrew its bid on the grounds that 
economic conditions were not right (factor 3). This left Scottish Power’s Longannet project as the only 
remaining participant in the competition.  
 
Their project was based on a collaboration between ScottishPower (one of the UK’s ‘big six’ utilities), 
National Grid (the company operating the gas transmission grid in the UK) and Shell. The Longannet CCS 
project was planned on a 2.4 GW coal-fired power plant in Scotland which opened in 1969. Within this 
consortium, ScottishPower was responsible for the post combustion carbon capture and compression at 
Longannet power station. The ambition was to capture and store 20 million tonnes of CO2 over a 10-15 
year period by retrofitting an amine-based carbon capture unit onto parts of the power plant (300MW 
capacity). Aker Clean Carbon was to be the carbon capture technology provider. National Grid was 
responsible for onshore transport and compression at St Fergus. Transport of the carbon would take 
place largely through existing pipelines operated by National Grid, but about 100km of new pipelines 
were required. Shell was responsible for offshore transport and storage. Carbon storage was to take 
place in a depleted offshore gas field. The project was supposed to start operating in 2014 (Markusson, 
Ishii et al. 2011; ENDS Report 445) (factor 1).  
 
However, in October 2011 the Scottish power consortium also pulled out of the competition. The 
developers concluded that their plant would cost £1.2-£1.5bn whereas only £1bn of public funding was 
available (Scottish Power CCS Consortium, 2011a). DECC cited increased costs and the inability to reach 
a commercial agreement as the reasons for the collapse of the project. In a critical report that sought to 
draw lessons for the government, the National Audit Office pointed to a number of contributory factors 
(NAO, 2012). These included poor commercial awareness within government, a lack of government 
capacity to procure such large, complex projects, a lack of flexibility with respect to project 
specifications and the lack of a business case for the competition. Newspaper articles citing sources 
close to the negotiations argued that a crucial point of disagreement between the consortium and the 




After the collapse of the negotiations DECC moved quickly to confirm that the £1bn set aside for the first 
demonstration would be ‘available for a new process’ (DECC, 2011b). Further confirmation of the UK 
Government’s aspirations for CCS were contained in the December 2011 Carbon Plan (DECC, 2011d). 
The Plan foresees up to 10GW of CCS plants in the UK by 2030. The Plan also makes it clear that the 
government’s enthusiasm is dependent on how CCS technologies fare in comparison with other low 
carbon options. It states that the overall objective is to ‘run a low carbon technology race between CCS, 
renewables and nuclear power’ (DECC, 2011d: 72). Nevertheless, the then Energy Minister Charles 
Hendry MP stated in a subsequent speech that he wanted to ‘emphasise the UK Government’s firm 
commitment to Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and our determination to see the technology ready 
to be commercially deployed in the 2020s’ (Hendry, 2012). 
 
In summary, despite political commitment to demonstrate CCS in the UK since at least 2005, and despite 
the availability of £1 billion in public subsidies to support demonstration, it has proven to be impossible 
so far to procure a large scale, integrated CCS demonstration project. However, government efforts to 
procure such a project continue. In March 2013 the competition entered the next phase with DECC 
announcing two preferred bidders (the Peterhead Project, and the White Rose Project) (DECC 2013) and 
in early 2014 DECC announced £100m funding for both consortia to undertake front end engineering 
and design studies which are now underway. The White Rose project would also receive EU funding 
once a final investment decision is taken and match funding from DECC is obtained.  
 
4. CCS in Canada and Shell’s Quest project 
Although Canada was an early advocate of international action on climate change and - after much 
internal political wrangling - ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, the country has so far failed to adopt 
carbon pricing and comprehensive greenhouse gas (GHG) controls at the national level (factor 2). A 
carbon intensive economic development trajectory, continuing population and economic growth, and a 
rapidly expanding oil export sector (factor 3) were always going to make attainment of an over-
ambitious Kyoto target difficult. Add to this a decentralized constitutional structure which places natural 
resource ownership in provincial (rather than federal) hands, the bitter legacy of the National Energy 
Policy enacted by the federal government in response to 1970s oil shocks which was perceived in 
Western Canada as a federal ‘resource grab’ (factor 4), and the repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol by the 
Unites States (Canada’s main trading partner) (factor 6), and some of the reasons that prompted 
successive Liberal governments continuously to defer domestic action on climate change become clear 
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(Macdonald 2009). The current Conservative government, which has vocally opposed national carbon 
pricing and consistently minimized climate risks, announced in 2009 that henceforth Canada’s GHG 
abatement policies would be explicitly aligned with those of its neighbor to the south, and signalled 
toward the end of 2011 its intention to withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, a decision which took legal 
effect on 11 December 2012 (factor 2).  
 
Previous work has shown that some of the developed countries that had the most difficulty with the 
Kyoto protocol (Australia, Canada, and the United States) were among the most enthusiastic supporters 
of CCS (Meadowcroft and Langhelle, 2009). In these jurisdictions, substantial funding for technological 
innovation was to some extent presented as an alternative to the early introduction of carbon pricing. 
There is no doubt that the Canadian government sees CCS as of potential strategic significance to the 
country’s long term economic prosperity, and support for CCS research and demonstration has been a 
centrepiece of federal climate initiatives (factor 2). Yet in the absence of national leadership on carbon 
pricing, much climate change policy is also being undertaken at the provincial level. CCS figures in the 
climate change action and energy planning of several provinces, but it is mainly in the prairie provinces 
of Alberta and Saskatchewan that CCS is being actively pursued. Shell's Quest project is being developed 
outside of Edmonton, Alberta. 
 
Alberta’s approach to climate change was initially based on voluntary measures, but concern that the 
federal government might act unilaterally in this area led the province to propose its own (truncated) 
carbon pricing regime in 2007. The Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program passed in that year requires 
facilities that emit more than 100,000 tonnes of GHGs a year to reduce their carbon intensity by 12% 
(from a baseline date of July 1, 2007). Businesses that fail to meet their intensity targets can (a) acquire 
emissions credits from another covered facility, (b) purchase offsets from an Alberta-based entity or 
generate offsets internally though investment in specified technologies, or (c) pay a levy to a Climate 
Change and Emissions Management Fund (CCEMF) (Leach 2012). The price companies must pay for a 
tonne of emissions if they select the final option was set at $15 and has not yet been altered.2 Since its 
inauguration, the program has contributed $257 million to the fund, nearly half of which has been 
committed to a variety of projects, some of which are CCS-related (Environment Canada 2012). Alberta’s 
current climate change action plan, entitled Responsibility/Leadership/Action, was released in 2008 and 
elaborates a three-pronged strategy centered on conservation/efficiency, greening energy production, 
and implementing CCS. CCS accounts for the lion’s share of emissions reductions under this plan - 
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approximately 70% of the 2050 target of 200 megatonnes below a business-as-usual projection for that 
year (Alberta 2008) (factor 2). 
 
In April 2008 the Alberta government also passed the Carbon Capture and Storage Funding Act which set 
aside $2bn to help fund the development of CCS in the province. The government established a Carbon 
Capture and Storage Development Council to advise the province on how to proceed with creating an 
environment conducive to the technology. The report of the council provided a long list of policy, 
regulatory and technological recommendations, most of which are summed up by what the Council 
termed the ‘key ingredient’: sustained will. In practice, this meant significant government funding (over 
and above the announced $2bn) and a concerted effort to put in place a regulatory framework to 
provide clarity and certainty to industry and assurances on safety and environmental impact to the 
public (Alberta Carbon Capture and Storage Development Council 2009). In 2010 the province passed 
the Carbon Capture and Storage Amendment Act, a key piece of legislation that amended several other 
acts in order to address concerns about long-term liability and storage space ownership (factor 2).   
 
Quest is one of several fully-integrated CCS projects in Canada. Other projects include Boundary Dam in 
Saskatchewan (a coal-fired electricity plant), the Alberta Carbon Trunk Line or ACTL (gas processing and 
fertilizer manufacturing), and the Fort Nelson CCS project in northern British Columbia (gas processing). 
The plan for Quest is to capture emissions from three hydrogen manufacturing units attached to Shell’s 
Scotford Upgrading plant in Fort Saskatchewan, Alberta, using Shell’s activated amine capture 
technology called “Shell ADIP-X”. The hydrogen is used to upgrade bitumen produced from the 
Athabasca Oilsands Project (AOSP, a collaborative initiative between Shell Canada Ltd., Chevron Canada 
Ltd., and Marathon Oil Canada Corporation) (factor 1).  
 
Quest will contribute to Shell’s compliance with Alberta’s emissions regulations as well being part of a 
larger corporate strategy to lower the carbon intensity of their business. The project has the capacity to 
capture up to 1.2 million tonnes of CO2 a year until 2025, reducing the emissions resulting from the 
hydrogen production plant used to process the bitumen by 80%. However, the energy penalty 
associated with the process itself will result in additional emissions of between 162 and 238kt CO2e/a. 
Expansions to the upgrader and the inclusion of a bitumen blending plant will dramatically increase the 
emissions of the Scotford facility as well. In all, after the additional projects, Quest will only reduce GHG 
emissions from the upgrader on the order of about 15-16% (from 5,582kt CO2e/a to ~4,700 kt CO2e/a). 
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The initial cost estimate was between $900m and $1.2bn in capital costs and between $34m and $42m 
in annual operating costs (factor 1). 
 
Quest’s timeline mirrors that of CCS policy developments in Alberta. Shell began working on preliminary 
designs for Quest in early 2008 and initially expected to make a final investment decision in the first 
quarter of 2012. The company undertook extensive community consultation throughout 2008 and 2009, 
before submitting three project applications and an environmental impact assessment to the Alberta 
Energy Resources Conservation Board (ECRB) in 2010. These were approved in July 2012, with only a few 
conditions mainly pertaining to additional reporting. In 2011, the provincial government announced it 
would contribute $745m over 15 years from the dedicated CCS fund to QUEST. In the wake of the high-
profile cancellation of another proposed CCS project in the province (owing to the financial cost of CCS 
in the absence of significant carbon pricing and/or a willing partner to purchase emissions for enhanced 
oil recovery) the province announced it would offer a double-crediting for emissions reductions that 
took place by way of CCS.3 Shell also sought and received $120m of funding from the federal 
government’s Clean Energy Fund. The final investment decision to proceed with the project was taken 
on the 5th of September 2012. In August 2014, Shell reported that construction of the capture facility 
was 70 per cent complete, with the facility start up scheduled for September 2015. 
 
5. Analysis: The Political Economy of CCS Demonstration in Canada and the UK 
In this section, we reflect on similarities and differences between the two CCS demonstration project 
decision-making processes along the key political economy factors (as outlined in Figure 1 and Table 1). 
Our aim here is to test the suggested conceptual framework and to illuminate the complex interplay of 
political and economic factors that influence both industry and government decision-making regarding 
CCS, and which are argued to make the demonstration of the technology a more or less challenging 
affair at different times and/or places. Figures 2 and 3 highlight key insights from our analysis which will 
be discussed in more detail below. 
 
In terms of project characteristics (factor 1), Longannet and Quest are different kinds of CCS projects - 
Longannet was a proposed coal-fired electricity project whereas Quest is a hydrogen production CCS 
project. According to the IEA’s CCS roadmap, Quest thus falls into the category of ‘first phase’ industrial 
applications of CCS, while Longannet does not (IEA 2013: 14). First phase projects, the IEA notes, are 
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considered more mature and typically have lower additional costs than projects in the power sector. 
Despite substantial federal and provincial funding for the Quest project, and a last minute doubling of 
the price for carbon reductions secured via CCS, Shell still expects there to be a substantial financial cost 
for implementing CCS on its hydrogen upgrading plant. Yet this project is moving forward. As we will see 
soon, its link to oil sands production is critical (factor 3). However, we will argue below that the 
straightforward 'financial gap' explanation cannot entirely account for the differing fortunes of the two 




Figure 2: Key political economy factors influencing the realization of the Longannet CCS 
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With respect to government policy objectives, frameworks and measures (factor 2), both the UK and 
Alberta had taken steps – beginning around 2007 – toward defining a carbon reduction target, 
specifying the important role that CCS would play in meeting that target, and designing and 
implementing CCS-specific policies that would help facilitate the development of the technology. The 
manner in which the jurisdictions proceeded to support CCS differed, however: the UK adopted a 
‘competitive bidding’ approach, initially restricted only to post-combustion projects in the coal power 
sector, while Alberta created an open technology fund not restricted to any particular type of CCS 
project. The impetus behind the UK’s approach was a long-standing policy preference for competition 
(factor 4) (Kern, Kuzemko et al. 2014), driven in part by concerns about ‘overpaying’. In Alberta, the aim 
was to promote the development of CCS through a slightly closer partnership between government and 
industry without restricting the type or application of the technology chosen. These different policy 
choices (factor 2) were thus partly influenced by institutional path dependency (in the form of policy 
legacies, factor 4) in both countries and the result was a more flexible policy in the Canadian case, and 
the consequent proposal of several CCS projects in a variety of different industries (incl. the hydrogen 
upgrading plant) whereas the UK government focussed narrowly on coal-fired power generation and a 
competition process.  
   
Other political-institutional factors (factor 4) also played a role in shaping the different outcomes of the 
two planned projects. In the UK, the main government actors responsible for decisions about CCS are 
the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC), which is tasked with meeting the long-term 
emissions targets, and HM Treasury (the UK finance ministry), which has to approve funding for the 
demonstration plant, and in times of economic austerity and public sector cuts (factor 4) was hesitant to 
provide funding at the required scale. The Treasury also has responsibility for economic instruments 
affecting the energy industry. The relationship between these two Departments during the Longannet 
negotiations was a difficult one. The National Audit Office criticised DECC because it only “established 
finance for the capital costs of the project three years after its predecessor launched the competition 
and did not reach agreement with the Treasury on the funding for operating costs” (NAO 2012: 9). A 
DECC civil servant admitted that relations between the two departments were ‘quite strained’ during 





Canada, on the other hand, is a federal state with a very different governance structure for energy and 
climate change matters, especially as they pertain to CCS (factor 4). At the federal level, Natural 
Resources Canada (NRCAN) is the principal department involved, administering the clean energy 
technology fund that has subsidized several CCS projects (including Shell Quest) as well as directly 
conducting research and development on CCS technologies at its CanmetENERGY research centres in 
Ottawa and Alberta. The natural resources portfolio is of central importance to the current Conservative 
government, which is strongly committed to rapid development of the resource  
 
In terms of economic factors (factor 3), there are some economic development interests being served in 
the UK’s moves to support economy - including hydro carbon extraction - across Canada. They see CCS 
as a critical technology going forward, and while many climate programs associated with the previous 
Liberal government have been wound down, funding for CCS has increased. Such support has been 
critical in enabling CCS projects to move forward.   
 
Despite the long history of tension between the Canadian federal government and the government of 
Alberta over the management of energy resources (Canada's decentralized constitution places resource 
ownership in provincial hands), on the issue of supporting CCS and aggressively expanding oil sands 
production their policies have been essentially aligned. In Alberta it is the Department for Environment 
and Sustainable Resource Development that administers the province’s climate change strategy and 
policies (as noted above, the strategy relies heavily on CCS to meet its targets by 2050), but importantly 
it is the Minister of Energy who administers the CCS fund set up in 2008 (factor 4). This joined-up push 
for CCS both by the federal and Albertan government is in contrast with the situation in the UK as 
described above which contributes to the explanation of the different faiths of the two demonstration 
projects. CCS. The electricity market in the UK is dominated by six large utilities which wield significant 
influence over energy policy decisions. These players are seen as very important in fulfilling the 
government’s climate change ambitions. CCS promises to allow the electricity sector to adapt to the 
UK’s carbon reduction objectives without significantly changing status quo business practices. For 
utilities with large existing coal fired power stations like Scottish Power  
“a key reason to participate in the Government competition has been to secure the future of the 
almost 40-year-old Longannet power plant. With the recent flue gas desulphurization technology 
upgrades, the plant may continue to operate for a few decades if it can comply with future CO2 
emissions regulations” (Markusson, Ishii et al. 2011: 297). 
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Yet it is also important to note that during the competition process ScottishPower was taken over by the 
Spanish energy company Iberdrola, which had much less interest in the project due to the difficult 
economic situation in Spain but also the lack of applicability of CCS to its domestic and other 
international markets (Moores 2012) (factor 1). Other utilities with sunk investments in nuclear plants 
and less involvement in coal fired generation are even less interested in CCS, and more generally the 
electricity sector has a range of options for decarbonisation (e.g. new renewables as well as nuclear 
power) and therefore not all utilities see CCS as the way forward. One of the big areas of investment and 
resource potential has been offshore wind in which the UK is the world leader in terms of installed 
capacity (around 2.7GW at the end of 2012) (Kern, Smith et al. 2014).  
 
Coal mining is no longer a significant economic activity in the UK (Turnheim and Geels 2012), so there is 
no strong coal lobby involved in UK CCS policy decisions (factor 3). The existing oil and gas companies as 
well as National Grid potentially have an interest in preserving their business model in the short and 
medium term focussing on additional production capacity in the North Sea and using the existing 
pipeline network for the transport of CO2, but on the other hand declining domestic reserves make this 
incentive to adopt CCS in the long-term less important. Interview evidence pointed to the fact that both 
Shell and National Grid were much less committed and active in the Longannet process compared to 
ScottishPower (Moores 2012).  
 
In contrast, while CCS could be used to enable continued use of fossil fuel resources in power generation 
in the UK, the overall value of decarbonized fossil fuel electricity through CCS pales in comparison to the 
value of the resources that could be ‘unlocked’ in Canada through the use of the technology (factor 3). 
We consider CCS to ‘unlock’ some fossil fuel resources, not because the technology is integral to their 
production, but because in an increasingly carbon conscious world any decrease in the overall carbon 
content of these fuels makes them that much more marketable on international markets (factors 3 and 
6).  In other words, unconventional fossil fuel resources – in particular the oilsands – are one of the 
largest ‘emissions-intensive, trade-exposed’ industries. Of the 21% of Albertan GDP that comes from 
energy exports, 95% of that is from fossil fuel exports to the US alone. That means that almost 1/5th of 
Alberta’s GDP is directly exposed to actions taken to address climate change in the US, which in terms of 
our framework means that there is a strong interaction between international dimensions (e.g. 
California’s low carbon fuel standard, EU pressure in the same direction) and domestic economic and 




It is therefore not surprising that policies such as California’s low carbon fuel standard, as well as 
anticipated similar policies in Europe (factor 6), would be a key inducement to province officials and 
industry to support projects such as Quest that can reduce the carbon intensity of oil sands operations. 
Fuel standard regulations require the life-cycle emissions of fuels to meet a declining target based on 
expectations about the best available technology or fuel at a given time. For the Californian standard, 
the 2011 maximum was supposed to be ~96 grams of CO2 per liter. As Shell itself mentions in its 
informational pamphlet on the oil sands, recent studies suggests bitumen derived fuels are around 5-
15% more carbon intensive than an average barrel of US crude on a ‘wells-to-wheel’ basis – almost 
exactly what Shell submitted for its environmental assessment of Quest (Stantec 2010:s 5.7.1.7).  In 
other words, with the addition of the Quest CCS facility, the unconventional crude oil produced in the 
Athabasca Oilsands Project is expected to have a carbon content of almost exactly the target value set in 
California’s standard. 
 
In terms of public and political opposition to CCS (factor 5), neither project stirred significant opposition. 
The proposed Longannet project has been “supported by an array of stakeholders and has had minimal 
public opposition” (Markusson, Ishii et al. 2011: 297). In Alberta, where there is general acceptance of 
the centrality of hydrocarbon extraction to the provinces economic future and communities are used to 
hosting oil and gas operations, there was virtually no opposition. And yet, no doubt influenced by 
negative experience in other jurisdictions, Shell undertook extensive stakeholder consultations and 
invested considerable resources in community engagement throughout the Quest project.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Our analysis suggests that the interplay between different sets of factors, especially project types and 
policy orientations (in both cases) with political-institutional elements (in the UK case) and economic 
factors and international elements (in the Canadian case) explain the differing outcomes. One 
somewhat surprising feature of these cases is that the UK has been known as a climate leader, with a 
relatively developed policy framework, while Canada has consistently failed to meet aspirational 
emissions reductions targets and has yet to introduce a national carbon pricing regime, but it is the 
Canadian project that went ahead. Here the lure of continuing to exploit massive fossil reserves, and the 
potential threat to market access, provided a powerful incentive for public and private actors to ensure 
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Shell Quest went ahead. These findings support our earlier contention that the relative significance of 
the major factors illustrated in Figure 1 and Table 1, and the specific items that are salient under each of 
the general headings, will vary in different CCS demonstration projects and cannot be determined a 
priori.   
Yet, we believe the two case studies illustrate the value of the framework in guiding analytical attention 
and highlighting key sets of issues. Indeed this political economy derived framework could quite usefully 
be applied to understand outcomes at other CCS demonstration projects. For example, Boundary Dam, 
the first commercial scale pulverised coal plant retrofitted with CCS has commenced operations in 
Saskatchewan in October 2014. With this project there is a double fossil dividend (the plant runs on 
locally sourced high sulfur coal for which there is no alternative market (factor 3), and the captured CO2 
is being sold for enhanced oil recovery at the Weyburn-Midale field, providing the operator with 
enhanced income and the province with additional revenues through oil royalties (factors 1 and 3), and 
the project proponent SaskPower is a provincially-owned utility (factor 1). Or, the Barendrecht project in 
the Netherlands where public opposition played a critical role in the project cancellation (factor 5), but 
project characteristics (storage proposed under a residential neighborhood, factor 1) and policy 
frameworks were also part of the story (Brunsting, Best-Waldhober et al. 2011). This suggests an avenue 
for usefully extending this research. By employing this analytical framework to build up a wider bank of 
case studies, it may then be possible to determine whether some patterns of interaction among the key 
political-economy factors influencing the fate of proposed CCS demonstration projects are particularly 
common, and to explore the causes of this regularity. In this way our understanding of political 
economic interactions at different scales around CCS demonstration projects could be further extended 
and our analytical framework further refined. 
The aim of the paper was to elucidate the difficulty of technological demonstration, despite some levels 
of support from both industry and government, in a way that goes beyond the conventional explanation 
that simply points to the ‘financial gap’ for CCS. Rather, we argued the challenge of CCS demonstration 
arises out of the complex interplay of political and economic factors, at multiple levels of governance, 
which influence state and industry decision-making surrounding energy and climate change policy and 
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